Ph.D. in Economics, University of Cologne, Germany (2013)
Visiting Ph.D. student, University of Innsbruck, Austria (2011-2012)
Diploma in Economics (M.Sc. equivalent), University of Cologne, Germany (2009)
First State Examination in Mathematics and Social Sciences (M.Ed. equivalent), University of Cologne, Germany (2009)
Visiting student, University of Queensland, Australia (2007)
What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market: Evidence From a Field Study (joint with A. Rasch). Forthcoming in Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.
Price Competition and Reputation in Credence Goods Markets: Experimental Evidence (joint with W. Mimra and A. Rasch) [Young Economists' Essay Award, EARIE 2013] Games and Economic Behavior, 2016, 100, 337-352. Link
Second Opinions in Markets for Expert Services: Experimental Evidence (joint with W. Mimra and A. Rasch). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016, 131, 106-125. Link
Selected Working Papers & Work in Progress
(Non)exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection: An Experiment (joint with W. Mimra, 2017) Link (PDF, 722 KB) [previously entitled: Adverse Selection and Market Structure: An Experiment]
Abstract: The performance of markets with hidden information is of central importance in microeconomic theory. We present the results of a comprehensive experiment that distinguishes between the two crucial forms of hidden information, private and common values, in different contracting environments. Contracting environments vary by the degree of power that the screening market side has over the trades of its privately informed customers, from monopoly to nonexclusive competition. The degree of equilibrium play, in particular in the complex cases of common values, is striking. Under private values, competition ensures efficient trades. Under common values, low-type buyers are to a large extent excluded under nonexclusive competition, while such types are only distorted under exclusive competition. This leads to a significantly higher market surplus under exclusive compared to nonexclusive competition under common values.
Presented by co-author or myself at: EGRIE 2016, ESA 2016, University of Verona
Kickbacks, Referrals, and Efficiency in Health Care Markets: Experimental Evidence (joint with D. Wiesen, 2016) Link
Abstract: We analyse the causal effect of kickbacks (referral payments) on general practitioners' behaviours and efficiency. In a stylized model, we derive behavioural predictions for general practitioners' diagnostic efforts and referrals to secondary care (specialized physicians), which we test in a series of controlled laboratory experiments. We exogenously vary the level of regulated referral payments in our experimental treatments. We find that introducing referral payments significantly improves efficiency. An increase in payments leads to less undertreatment of severely-ill patients, but also to more unnecessary referrals of mildly-ill patients. The net effect is positive, as the former outweighs the latter. Interestingly, the increase in efficiency is largely driven by behavioural changes of barely altruistic general practitioners.
Presented by co-author or myself at: DGGÖ 2016, IIOC 2016, ASHEcon 2016, University of Basel
Health Services as Credence Goods: A Field Experiment (joint with F. Gottschalk and W. Mimra) Slides (PDF, 11.1 MB)
Abstract: Information problems are a defining characteristic in health care markets. Despite their importance, there is little direct evidence of the impact of information problems between patients and physicians on the quality of treatment. Furthermore, the role of market characteristics such as competition intensity is not well understood. In this paper, we present the results from a field experiment in the market for dental care. A test patient who does not require treatment is sent to 180 dentists to receive treatment recommendations. In the experiment, we vary two factors: First, the extent of the information asymmetry between patient and dentist. Second, we vary the perceived socioeconomic status (SES) of the test patient. Furthermore, we collect data to construct several measures of short- and long-term demand and competition as well as dentist and practice characteristics. We find that the patient receives an overtreatment recommendation in more than every fourth visit. A low short-term demand, indicating excess capacities, leads to significantly more overtreatment recommendations. Physician density and their price level however do not have a significant effect on overtreatment. Furthermore, we observe significantly less overtreatment recommendations for the patient with higher compared to lower SES under standard information, indicating a complex role of socioeconomic status. More patient information however does not significantly affect overtreatment.
Presented by co-author or myself at: Mines ParisTech, Tilburg University, Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Health Economics 2016, Workshop of the German Society for Health Economics on Allocation and Distribution 2016, DGGÖ 2017, International Health Policy Conference 2017, SMYE 2017, YSEM 2017
Rankings for Physicians: How to Motivate the Most? (joint with K. Huesmann and D. Wiesen)